Blood on the Snow Page 11

  The Russians initially withdrew a short distance along a major portion of their upper San River front. However, inconclusive Habsburg successes reversed when they coincided with a wave of severe winter storms and a powerful enemy counterattack on 26 January. As Habsburg casualties reached crisis levels, the front lines became overextended. This dangerous cycle forced surviving combatants to brave the harsh conditions for weeks while awaiting reinforcements, which often failed to arrive. Repeated orders to resume attacks resulted in the meager reinforcements being hurled piecemeal into battle to fill the appearing gaps. Overpowering Russian counterattacks later added to the troops’ misery.

  X Corps’ 34th Infantry Division reported severe losses, including numerous frostbite cases, while Infantry Regiment 90 suffered when it attacked strong enemy positions. One infantry regiment lost 700 to 800 men during a czarist counterattack. Foggy conditions and close proximity of front positions (200 to 300 paces) prevented artillery support. Troops had to shovel snow for supply traffic.26

  On 24 January, General Ivanov reported to Russian High Command (Stavka) that reinforced Habsburg troops had attacked some of his weak positions and requested four to five infantry divisions be transferred as reinforcements as soon as possible. He claimed that enemy troops intended to retake Fortress Przemyśl. The two czarist fronts (Germany and Austria-Hungary) resulted in the two front commanders squabbling over requests for troops, reserve formations, and additional supplies. General Ivanov pursued his cherished Carpathian offensive even though the Stavka had determined that the Russian 1915 priority was the German front. He would launch an overpowering counteroffensive against the unsavory Habsburg attackers on 26 January. Its major objective, Mezölaborcz, a key Habsburg communication center and railroad hub, witnessed bloody battle for the next two weeks.

  Meanwhile, the Habsburg Third Army left flank III Corps would launch an enveloping attack to the northwest to block enemy approach routes and protect Fourth Army’s southern flank IX Corps (inner army flanks). But III Corps must await further Third Army right flank success to advance, which did not occur. This forced Fourth Army to attack at the two armies’ inner flanks to assist Third Army forward momentum.27

  Heavy snowfall and dense fog early on 24 January made it difficult to prepare for the next day’s operation; terrain difficulties continued to retard progress and exhausted the troops; thus, forward momentum and operational success could not be restored.28 V Corps launched reconnaissance missions to ascertain suitable advance routes. Meanwhile, intelligence reports revealed that the Russians had strengthened their positions, including deploying heavy artillery at Borynia critical for an advance from Uzsok Pass and where a Habsburg assault had been planned.

  General Szurmay’s efforts had already failed, and each rearward move threatened Third Army’s right flank positions. Nevertheless, Habsburg troops continued their futile efforts to retake the main ridgelines lost in December 1914. The unfavorable conditions continued to cause a critical time loss and lack of artillery support for the unfortunate infantry.29

  When VII Corps’ 20th Honvéd Infantry Division did not launch its designated attack, the enemy hurled a surprise five- to six-battalion counterattack against the understrength neighboring 17th Infantry Division west of the Dukla roads. Two infantry companies surrendered, and heavy enemy machine gun fire caused serious losses, creating apprehension about the operation.30 At only twenty paces from the enemy, Habsburg troops failed to advance further, while a serious threat to the corps’ right flank positions occurred west of the Dukla road.

  Meanwhile, Third and South Army cooperative efforts faltered, partly because of the difficult mountainous terrain separating them. Neither army gained a significant tactical advantage nor overcame the wretched conditions. South Army attack units had advanced just ten kilometers from their original positions. Shoveling snow off roadways, particularly for new artillery positions, retarded swift movement. Soldiers sank chest-deep into the snow, while snowstorms halted all supportive artillery efforts. Troop exhaustion and darkness ended all progress. Major clashes stayed confined to areas closest to the few natural traversable routes through the valleys, but in as close a proximity to a railroad line as possible. Limited frontal attacks resulted in excessive bloodshed.31 Numerous assaults, often aimed at isolated enemy positions, allowed the Russians to shift reserves to thwart any momentary threat. Habsburg commanders often delayed obeying attack orders, preferring to await a neighboring units’ victory, which often never materialized.

  From the beginning, General Boroević expressed apprehension regarding the potential for success in the campaign, correctly predicting that the enemy would strike his battle-weary soldiers as soon as his forces committed to battle.32 Many Habsburg division commanders realized that any chance of success had ended. Meanwhile, on 25 January, unbeknownst to the Habsburg military, the Russians assembled substantial forces to launch a major counteroffensive, while Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin failed to succeed in its efforts on the eastern flank front. Casualties escalated as the weather conditions deteriorated. The Army Group attacked in −20°C temperatures in two meters of snow. It required three hours to advance just 1,000 paces, while the horrific conditions killed an enormous number of horses.33 As General Boroević unsuccessfully attempted to expand his right flank, heavy enemy contingents attacked his left flank forces, forcing them back to their original positions. Attacking Third Army middle units encountered strong Russian defensive positions.

  Group Szurmay, meanwhile, finally forced the enemy from Uzsok Pass as the snow turned to torrential rain, soaking the attacking troops. Many suffered from frostbite and other ailments, leading Szurmay to request a one- to two-day break from further offensive undertakings for his battered troops to find shelter. Meanwhile, the heavy rains transformed the single corps supply route into a terrible mess.34 The senior 66th Infantry Brigade physician reported that he encountered numerous cases of frostbite, overexertion, and hunger; having lost half its troop stand, the brigade required rest and rehabilitation.35 A 34th Infantry Division report (X Corps) emphasized that troop physical depression had reached epidemic proportions.36 The lack of adequate troop training and physical preparedness for winter mountain warfare exacerbated the crisis. Supply columns had to travel nearly thirty kilometers, with multiple delays.37 Loss of its supply route could prove disastrous to Szurmay’s forces.

  The V Corps at last attained its previous day’s objective, but with almost all reserve troops already committed to battle and those remaining considered unfit for front-line duty. However, to neutralize any threat to the Habsburg flank area, they must keep the Russians from the San River region. On 25 January Lutoviska and its railroad station capitulated, allowing the famished troops to advance further. Anticipating a clash with enemy vanguard units on 26 January, they actually attacked strong Russian positions. Significant terrain difficulties again prevented attaining the corps march goals of Ustrzyki Dolne. When Third Army failed to achieve its decisive success, it received orders to “hold to the last man” and avoid unnecessary losses.38 Unbeknownst to Habsburg Supreme Command, the battle raging between the Dukla and Uzsok passes had reached a turning point because the Habsburgs achieved no significant military success. Attack Group Puhallo (V and XVIII Corps) had attained the Upper San River region, but its insufficient troop numbers and the lack of reserve forces prevented further progress on this front. Nearby, XVIII Corps encountered unexpected resistance as it attempted to advance with no hope of a timely deployment of reinforcements.39 Some XVIII Corps troop units successfully crossed the San River, but during the process, the units became intertwined. When Conrad ordered the rapid movement of supply trains forward, food resources for the starving troops received priority over artillery shells and ammunition.40 Enemy counterattacks along the Dukla roads forced the VII Corps to retreat, creating a threatening gap between it and III Corps that introduced the danger of the enemy piercing the thin, overextended division lines, while also threatening the main Habsburg re
treat route.41

  X Corps’ attack efforts resulted in fierce, bloody encounters with the enemy, but successful enemy flanking maneuvers and heavy frontal fire forced a corps retreat. Deep snow and low-lying fog curtailed progress and left the benumbed Habsburg troops without artillery support. They endured four days with no protection from the elements as uniforms froze to their bodies. As significant czarist reinforcements deployed on the battlefield to launch a major counterattack, the condition of Habsburg troops had reached a critical point. During battle between 22 and 25 January, X Corps’ three divisions incurred enormous casualties but still continued their attack.42 The corps finally received orders to terminate its offensive on 25 January, to dig in, and to hold its forward positions. Having depleted all its reserve troops, X Corps awaited the insertion of the 29th Infantry Division, currently in transit, into Third Army’s weakening eastern flank attack in the Lupkov Pass area. Conrad ordered X Corps to regroup as the enemy increased its pressure against VII Corps’ denuded forces along the Dukla Pass road.43

  Telephone equipment continued to malfunction, exacerbating command functions, and as the wintry conditions intensified, X Corps reported that it could no longer resist the powerful enemy.44 Artillery and supply train columns had to be transported on sleds, and troops often had to hack frozen ground under enemy fire in order to create a path to advance.

  General Ivanov now attacked in an attempt to destroy the mauled Habsburg army. This, he reasoned, would sway Romania to join the Entente. Russian Third and Eighth armies would support the weaker czarist contingents already defending the 300-kilometer front extending from Uzsok Pass to the Romanian frontier. On 26 January Ivanov received the XXII Corps as reinforcements from the German front, which enabled him to unleash a major counteroffensive against Third Army’s left flank and middle positions (VII and X Corps). The weakened Third Army could not halt the ferocious onslaught and quickly sustained heavy casualties. As fierce battle erupted between the Dukla and Uzsok passes, the Russians focused their main attention on Dukla Pass, particularly the Mezölaborcz railroad and communication hub in the Laborcz Valley. These events resulted in intense, bitter fighting, which provided the deathblow to the Third Army offensive. Ivanov targeted the area between the Ondava and Laborcz valleys, where the mountains posed the least impediment for the shortest, most direct route to their objective: Budapest, Hungary.

  Ice storms and wintry weather conditions enveloped the mountains, while the evolving attrition battle produced enormous casualties. Group Szurmay reported that the heavy snow masses behind its main forward ridgelines posed a serious danger should its troops be forced to retreat and its rear echelon supply columns be unable to move forward.45 On 30 January, Szurmay requested additional labor units to keep the serpentine road to Uzsok Pass open.46

  The Russians exacted a heavy human toll on the Third Army positions situated between the Dukla and Lupkov passes.47 Three corps protected this obvious invasion route into Hungary along the seventy-seven-kilometer front extending through the Ondava and Laborcz valleys. Meanwhile, South Army engaged in a three-day battle through 27 January, but its winter equipment and armaments proved inadequate for the task. Hundreds of soldiers suffered frostbite, and many draft animals succumbed to the unbearable conditions. The South Army front fluctuated along the ice- and snow-covered ridges. Artillery positions, often too distant from the front lines, could not support the infantry, and German artillery had been trained for flat terrain deployment, which proved of little worth in the elevated terrain. Third Army command, in the meantime, ordered its battered troops to maintain their positions, but it lacked the reserve units necessary to halt the enemy onslaught. V Corps had attained its objectives when the Russians counterattacked their right flank positions, but Conrad ordered that the offensive be continued. XVIII Corps’ 43rd Infantry Division advanced north of Baligrod, but the reinforced enemy forces soon halted their retreat and put up ferocious resistance. Diminished troop numbers and the distended thirty-kilometer corps front ensured that the troops could not be relieved from front-line duty. The excessive demands and terrible conditions often resulted in attack orders failing to reach the front. The condition of South Army troops had also deteriorated. By mid-March, daily sick call fluctuated between 400 to 700 soldiers, while later, between 11 and 23 March, the army lost 6,758 men to illness alone.48

  The Russians launched their counterattacks along the critical Dukla roads in the most effective direction to devastate Habsburg troops. VII Corps bore the brunt of the initial czarist thrust as the enemy penetrated into the defensive lines west of the Dukla roads.49 Eight to twelve battalions smashed into the 20th Honvéd Infantry Division positions several times before advancing toward the sensitive Third and Fourth Army inner flank positions. Meanwhile, eight to ten battalions (8,000 troops) launched ten attacks against the 17th Infantry Division front, forcing it to retreat or face annihilation.50

  VII Corps sustained heavy casualties as the Russians repeatedly broke through its front. Without reserve troops, the corps situation rapidly became critical.51 Insufficient troop numbers and difficult terrain forced the left flank units to retreat. Further powerful enemy actions against the VII Corps front widened the gap between it and the III Corps. Russian prisoners of war alerted their interrogators to an impending strike against the reeling Habsburg lines, resulting in Corps Command ordering its troops to halt the looming enemy onslaught. After many days of marching over rough terrain, the few remaining reserves arrived at the front just as three Russian divisions launched an attack.52 Unable to resist, Habsburg troops withdrew.

  A 25 January South Army Corps Gerok report blamed the battlefront conditions for its lack of success. In addition to the normal difficulties, the pathless terrain traversed a primeval forest enveloped by at least a meter of snow. The temperature dropped to −23°C, further hampering supply efforts and causing an agonizing state for the troops. Many, on the verge of physical collapse, went without warm rations for days. The culmination of these circumstances reduced several Habsburg units to 30 to 40 percent of their original numbers.

  On the Third Army front, the enemy unleashed mass assaults during an ice storm. The Russians constantly deployed new forces toward the vital Mezölaborcz rail center; they also attempted to conquer the entire Dukla basin region. The czarist assaults, which endured until 10 February, forced Third Army to retreat to its initial attack positions. When the Russians smashed into X Corps lines defending Mezölaborcz, it immediately created a serious crisis. The czarist forces intended to sever the major Homonna–Mezölaborcz rail connection and separate the Habsburg armies, which would neutralize main Attack Group Puhallo’s successful advance.

  Table 3. Habsburg Losses During the First Offensive

  Corps/Group Troop Stand Reinforcements Losses Troop Stand

  23 January 1915 6 February 1915

  III. 17,070 4,000 9,000 12,070

  V. 17,660 5,500 16,600 16,500

  VII. 13,250 7,200 13,080 7,370

  X. 25,440 7,000 22,220 10,220

  XVIII. 19,530 1,500 8,010 13,020

  Group Szurmay 30,880 3,000 14,490 19,390

  XIX (29 ID) 10,940 2,500 5,440 7,900

  Total 134,770 30,700 88,900 76,570

  The czarist assault against VII Corps in the strategic Mezölaborcz–Lupkov–Cisna area followed parallel mountain heights to conquer the Mezölaborcz railroad junction and extend the ten-kilometer gap between it and III Corps. Habsburg defenders also suffered defeat and retreated from the Lupkov Pass area.53 Freezing temperatures, deep snow, and windy conditions prevailed in the mountains. The snow-packed roads, blanketed by a meter of fresh snow, proved almost impassable, resulting in multiple supply traffic stoppages. Civilians and troops alike labored on the most important road stretches.54 Commanders made frantic requests for the deployment of March company reserve troops to the front as soon as possible, despite the long, difficult marches to get there.

  The ensuing days witnessed further serious reversals along
the III, VII, and X Corps’ fronts.55 The Russian attack against Third Army west flank corps also disrupted the right flank offensive operations. X Corps retreated again after being pummeled by two overpowering enemy assaults, as VII Corps established new defensive positions while launching futile counterattacks against the superior enemy forces. This consumed the troops’ last vestige of strength.56 Half the troop stands consisted of inadequately trained and prepared Landsturm units, further decreasing Habsburg combat worthiness. XVIII Corps’ 43rd Infantry Division’s offensive capabilities disappeared in just five days, while its troops became apathetic. The division commander described his unit as defenseless.57 Immediately upon arrival at the front, the 29th Infantry Division deployed to rectify the deteriorating III and VII Corps military predicament. The threatening loss of the Cisna depot and railroad junction had to be prevented at all costs because it would sever V and XVIII Corps’ supply route. In one day, X Corps 24th Infantry Division recorded 174 cases of frostbite and a fatality as well as numerous lung-related illnesses.58

  Unfavorable battlefield conditions also continued to affect South Army offensive efforts. Exhausted soldiers advanced through deep snow that blanketed the wooded terrain and ridges without artillery support.59 The Russians gave no indication that they intended to surrender their favorable positions; therefore, they continued to attack.60 Meanwhile, the enemy gained valuable time to improve their defensive positions against South Army, which had lost five precious days.61 The czarist troops rapidly organized effective defensive resistance just a few kilometers behind evacuated front-line formations.