Blood on the Snow Page 8
Since October 1914 Pflanzer-Baltin’s forces had been conducting guerilla warfare and small-scale actions against third-line Russian cavalry divisions to prevent an enemy incursion into Hungary. At the advent of the New Year, the Russians seized control of some of the main Carpathian Mountain passes, and with the czarist invasion of the Bukovina, their troops had to be halted because of the threat of Romania entering the war. Thus, during early 1915, the Army Group received a few well-equipped units, the XI and XIII Corps, to enable it to participate in offensive operations. However, throughout the Carpathian campaign, Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin remained handicapped by the minimal railroad capacity to its theater, which limited the rapid transport of significant troop numbers. This inadequate railroad network had negatively affected the 1914 mobilization and deployment, and during the ensuing campaigns, they could not be utilized to the extent Habsburg Supreme Command desired.
Newly issued orders emphasized that if the Third Army’s initial offensive effort succeeded, Fourth Army must immediately attack the retreating enemy. In addition, on 22 January, a Group Szurmay brigade must assist V Corps 33rd Infantry Division in recapturing Uzsok Pass and then jointly advance to Turka. Group Szurmay’s units maneuvered through meter-deep snow, which took a physical toll on its troops.
General Boroević’s revised Third Army offensive mission called for the seizure of the strategically important Ustrzyki Dolne transportation center to prevent the enemy from accessing its major Lisko and Sanok transportation hubs. Habsburg control of the Lutoviska–Baligrod area would also threaten Russian Eighth Army flank positions. A Habsburg offensive force composed of ten infantry and two cavalry divisions would either advance north to seize the Uzsok Pass–Turka–Stary Sambor area, or northeast toward the Solinka and San rivers. Success of the Third Army’s operation hinged on close cooperation of the neighboring South and Fourth Army southern flank efforts.92
In the meantime, intelligence reports indicated that the Russians would be receiving a reinforcing corps in East Galicia and another in the Bukovina. Habsburg Fourth Army, although facing strong enemy positions and constantly transferring units to participate in the approaching offensive, received orders to block the transfer of enemy troops to Third Army’s front. Artillery shells must be conserved for the forthcoming offensive and thus should be utilized only to defend against an enemy attack.93
On 12 January X Corps advancing artillery units proceeding into the mountains halted for an extended period along a stretch of mountain road. Additional batteries received orders to move forward to supplement the few already in position.94 Six men of Infantry Regiment 29 had frozen to death, while fifty more suffered severe frostbite—an ominous harbinger for the forthcoming campaign. A partial mission of the main Attack Group Puhallo in conjunction with Pflanzer-Baltin’s Corps Hofmann was to reconquer Uzsok Pass by launching the mentioned two-pronged attack. V Corps troops must be deployed by 12 January in preparation for the operation. The other major offensive force, Group Krautwald (2nd, 24th, 34th, and 43rd Infantry divisions), must seize Baligrod, then strike toward the Lisko–Sanok railroad centers as soon as Group Puhallo had established adequate flank security. X Corps 2nd Infantry Division would provide that security. General Josef Freiherr Krautwald von Annaue began the war as commander of the 34th Infantry Division, but in January 1915 he became the commander of the Third Army X Corps, which fought in the major battle at Mezölaborcz. His command included the 2nd, 24th, and 34th Infantry divisions. Krautwald was promoted to general of the infantry on 1 May 1917. Meanwhile, Group Joseph (essentially VII Corp’s 17th and 20th Honvéd Infantry and 1st Cavalry divisions) must seize and hold the entrance to the Dukla and Jasliska Passes to prevent the transfer of significant enemy troop numbers against the Third Army attack groups. Group Colerus (III Corps’ 22nd and 28th Infantry and 4th Cavalry divisions) initially must block the approaches to Zmigrod and later join the attack. Groups Colerus and Joseph (Third Army left flank units) would advance when the Third Army right flank forces forced the enemy’s withdrawal from the vital transportation centers.95
A high-ranking Habsburg Operations Bureau General Staff officer warned that the proposed main Attack Group San River offensive would be “methodical mass murder.” He further complained about the “headlessness” in the command chain and the obvious inferiority of Habsburg artillery in comparison to that of the Russians.96
Transfer of XIX Corps from the Balkan theater to the Carpathian front commenced on 22 January and continued as the corps mission evolved into neutralizing any enemy advance toward Czeremcha in the key Ung Valley.97 Third Army numbers presently were too weak to engage in any decisive undertaking; nevertheless, it must prevent further Russian territorial gains. Numerous units requisitioned additional food rations and heavy sleds because of the problems created by poor road conditions.98
Army maps, critical for both planning operations and position orientation, were often obsolete and also did not present such important new features as railroad lines or their extensions. The failure of bridges and roads to be listed resulted from civilian authorities failing to inform the military of their existence. Maps of Hungary proved particularly misleading because general-purpose and special editions did not coincide. Town names and various locations varied depending on the particular map. The prewar Magyarization process resulted in many German and Slavic names being replaced with their Hungarian versions on more recent renderings.
Habsburg units continued to encounter numerous obstacles completing troop deployments and other preparations for the impending offensive. For example, on 13 January X Corps reported that its few natural valley passageways had flooded and all movement had slowed to one kilometer per hour. On higher terrain, snow obscured gigantic potholes, requiring that horse march columns first test sections of roadways before bringing artillery and ammunition columns forward. Road surfaces were in continual need of shoveling, and the loss of horses continued.
Many artillery pieces had to be disassembled for transport into the mountains. The few guns placed into firing positions had to be pulled by multiharnessed pack animal teams interspersed among ammunition columns. The transport of crucial artillery became increasingly difficult on the treacherous terrain. To their dismay, arriving V Corps divisions discovered that their artillery batteries had not been ordered forward.
On 13 January, a major reconnaissance mission reconfirmed that only two enemy cavalry divisions defended the crucial area between Uzsok Pass and Baligrod. General Ivanov had requested reinforcements because of the recognized czarist numerical weakness between the two locations, but also planned to puncture Habsburg lines defending the Dukla Pass and seize Mezölaborcz, crippling Habsburg offensive efforts to rescue Fortress Przemyśl. In addition to General Conrad’s obvious multiple problems, Foreign Minister Berchtold insisted that the recent enemy seizure of the Bukovina province and resultant threat to Transylvania signified that Romania would enter the war if it appeared advantageous to seize its irredenta goals.99 Berchtold insisted that something had to be done on that front! During the night 13 to 14 January, South and Third Army received orders for their units to cooperate and advance to seize Uzsok Pass, although some units designated to participate in the operation had just begun their transport to the front. Both armies must bind opposing enemy troops while completing preparations for the offensive.100 The rugged mountain terrain selected for South Army deployment forced it to be divided into three attack groups to achieve its mission by launching envelopment movements against the enemy. South Army’s terrain proved much more challenging compared to Third Army’s. The revised 14 January Third Army offensive plan included V Corps’ 33rd Infantry Division rapidly advancing to the Uzsok Pass to strike Russian flank and rear positions. XVIII Corps’ primary mission remained to advance to Ustrzyki Górne while a separate detachment supported neighboring South Army efforts. Four divisions of Attack Group Krautwald must advance through Baligrod and then its left flank units swing toward Lisko–Sanok once main Attack
Group Puhallo achieved success. The army’s left flank Group Joseph’s (VII Corps) and Group Colerus’ (III Corps) missions remained the same. Two divisions served as a reserve pool (7th and 29th Infantry Divisions). Conserving artillery shells must continue while the Russian penchant for night attacks made night security a high priority.
The 14 January intelligence reports indicated that the Russians intended to launch an offensive at the Fourth Army Gorlice area.101 Little could be expected at this front area because of small troop numbers and Fourth Army having to transfer numerous divisions to the Carpathian theater to avoid having to attack particularly strong czarist positions. Meanwhile, the winter weather intensified: heavy frost deposited a thick coat of ice on roadways, while a further meter and a half of snow accumulated. Skis and wagons on sled runners became the necessary mode of artillery and supply transport. Blizzard conditions severely curtailed the pace of preparations for the forthcoming offensive undertaking. The resultant poor travel conditions caused XIX Corps to arrive twelve hours behind schedule. XVIII Corps troops shoveled drifted snow on the ridges.102 Lightly wounded soldiers assisted.
Inclement weather conditions, termed “a good indication of things to come” during the bitterest cold winter months, promised to produce a difficult campaign unprecedented in military history.103 The opening of a smallgauge forest railroad line for supply purposes presented its own unique problems, while regular railroad lines required constant shoveling. Group Szurmay (40th Infantry and 8th Cavalry divisions, 75th and 128th Infantry brigades, and 1st Hussar Cavalry Brigade) must cooperate in the effort to recapture Uzsok Pass and then advance to Turka and Stary Sambor to participate in main Attack Group Puhallo’s mission. Strong Russian resistance could be anticipated in the areas of Patakujfalu and Dvernik in the Ung Valley leading to the strategic Laborcz Valley.104
The necessity of a Fourth Army southern flank attack to support the approaching Third Army offensive received increasing attention. IX Corps flank units must prevent the Russians from attacking the Third Army’s northern III Corps at all costs. Fourth Army’s present mission included unconditionally maintaining its positions and launching a frontal assault against well-fortified enemy defensive positions at Gorlice. The operation’s success depended on the close cooperation of the inner flank III and IX Corps. However, terrain features separating the two corps made this an extremely difficult task.105 In addition to providing the main offensive thrust, Third Army must also support Fourth Army’s flank positions.
Conrad became agitated at an 11 January allied conference in Breslau when he realized that he faced a fait accompli. General Falkenhayn had made the decisions, and thus there would be no discussion. Meanwhile, 29th Infantry Division, one of the two reserve divisions, arrived in Mezölaborcz after a seventy-two-hour railroad transport during a snowstorm.
Hungarian premier Tisza joined Foreign Minister Berchtold’s earlier chastisement of Conrad for the recent evacuation of the Bukovina. If the Russians invaded Transylvania, Tisza predicted that Romania would enter the war.106 Conrad ordered Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin to launch an attack to roll up the enemy’s extreme flank positions to relieve pressure on the Bukovina front.
Meanwhile, by mid-January 1915, enemy pressure forced Third Army left flank units to retreat as czarist troops continued to infiltrate the Dukla Pass. Near Uzsok Pass, Habsburg units retreated from Verecke Ridge and Wyszkov Pass, where the South Army would soon launch its offensive. Russian activity had intensified where Habsburg forces intended to launch their attack; however, significant Habsburg Third Army reinforcements would not arrive until mid-January at the earliest.
During the night to 15 January critical road improvements were completed during heavy snowfall and fog conditions. Reconnaissance patrols shoveled their way through snowdrifts. The troops found themselves increasingly unprepared for the demanding circumstances. The proliferation of Slavic national propaganda produced an increasingly negative effect on troop morale, discipline, and the cohesion of certain units, particularly Czech.
Troop units ranging from engineering to infantry performed critical road repairs and maintenance. XVIII Corps utilized 700 hand-pulled sleds for supply transport, while V Corps possessed none.107 Snowdrifts blocked roadways, and dry wood for building sleds was in short supply, a problem made worse by the fact that labor crews had not been issued saws.108
Field officers complained that senior commanders, such as Conrad, were unaware of the situation at the front because they never visited it. Meanwhile, Conrad’s offensive plans would prevent Russian troops from advancing into Transylvania from the Bukovina and preclude unnecessary compromise with Italy.109 Relative to Fortress Przemyśl, a report indicated that if 3,500 horses were slaughtered immediately, the garrison could hold out until 7 March. General Kusmanek, citing dwindling food reserves, inquired whether the fortress would be relieved in the near future or whether he should attempt a breakout effort. Conrad delayed his reply to the query. Foraging efforts before the fortress perimeter provided sufficient food for the garrison to survive another week.110 In the interim, VII Corps, commanded by Archduke Joseph August von Alcsut, buttressed its security preparations for defending the Laborcz Valley while V Corps units advanced into the Solinka Valley. The Archduke commanded VII Corps from November 1914 for two years. He became notorious as the commander of the devastated Hungarian Fourth Army at the onset of the Brusilov offensive. Two V Corps divisions must occupy Ustrzyki Górne and the nearby heights while the third established positions in the Ondava Valley. XIII Corps, scheduled to arrive on 28 January, would provide the impetus for Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s offensive into the Bukovina and protection of the neighboring South Army flank position.111
On 23 January, part of the South Army mission was to advance east of Uzsok Pass in unison with Third Army Group Szurmay. Allied friction continued over provisioning concerns for the South Army German units. On 15 January, General Ludendorff threatened Conrad that unless German troops received the proper mountain equipment, he should not expect their assistance. Conrad meanwhile assured General Falkenhayn that the maximum number of forces had been designated for the rapidly approaching major offensive—a gross exaggeration.
Significant Russian pressure continued against the Dukla Pass, the most favorable terrain to puncture the thin Austro-Hungarian lines defending Hungary. No significant czarist reinforcements had been detected in the Uzsok Pass region destined for a major assault effort.112 However, the Russians had reportedly begun creating an army composed of four to five reserve divisions with 110,000 to 120,000 troops in preparation to invade either Transylvania or Hungary. This threatened South Army and Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin offensive efforts because only Landsturm troops could deflect the new threat.
Map 4. Habsburg VII Corps, 27 January 1915
On 16 January a X Corps daily logbook entry stated that “deficient preparations [for the offensive] are unavoidable.”113 Additional corps logbooks frequently noted the insurmountable difficulties encountered in attempting to maintain supply and troop movement through drifting snow. Less than a week before the launching of the offensive, important supply routes remained unusable; X Corps must conduct a long detour to provide the much-needed goods. Hand-pulled sleds and reserve draft animal columns transported the most crucial necessities over the steep mountain slopes. The thirty toboggans provided per division assisted such efforts.114 The troops’ physical and moral conditions continued to decline as incidents of frostbite increased dramatically.
One strategic supply route was reported only passable for individual sled columns, but multiple sections required special caution during usage. Crucial road stretches still required constant maintenance services. The steep inclines and drifting snow made movement dangerous. Futile efforts continued to maintain the passageways for troop and supply purposes.
The East Carpathian Mountain region had been quiescent during the last half of December 1914, but in early January 1915 the Russians launched the mentioned offensive into
the Bukovina, threatening Pflanzer-Baltin’s western group rear echelon area. Russian occupation of the Bukovina continued to provide an imminent threat of a czarist invasion of Transylvania and Romanian intervention against the Dual Monarchy. The unfavorable Habsburg military situation, combined with the deficient railroads leading to that theater, still prohibited transfer of large troop numbers to that area. The late arrival of XIII Corps, however, forced a delay in the Group Pflanzer-Baltin offensive undertaking.
General Adolf Freiherr Rhemen zu Bärensfeld commanded the Habsburg XIII Corps from 12 October 1912 until July 1916. During the Carpathian Winter War, XIII Corps first defended against a stronger Russian Dniester Group and later the Russian Ninth Army.
Group Puhallo must advance on 20 January to seize the Ustrzyki Górne area. Third Army’s northernmost III Corps must cooperate with the Fourth Army IX Corps flank positions to neutralize any enemy attack at their inner flanks, while a seven-mile gap separated Third Army’s III and VII Corps.115
On 17 January, night security measures increased while much work remained to improve present positions. Instructions were issued to spare horses and wagons.116 Third Army reconnaissance missions confirmed deployment of additional enemy infantry and artillery units before their lines. XIX Corps troops finally began arriving in strength, as corps reports described the multiple difficulties resulting from the unfavorable conditions. X Corps reported chest-deep snow, enormous snowdrifts, and blocked passageways. Modifying sleds for use with ammunition wagons required extensive improvisation. XVIII Corps prepared bridge equipment for its attempted crossing of the San River, but blizzard conditions severely handicapped all efforts. Ice-coated wires disrupted telephone communication. Fatefully, multiple troop formations designated for the offensive had still not arrived. The X Corps three divisions (2nd, 24th, and 34th) possessed only three mountain artillery pieces. Conrad ordered additional artillery units transferred to the front lines regardless of prevailing conditions, but to no avail.